7外文原文及譯文

北京聯(lián)合大學畢業(yè)論文外文原文及譯文題目： 浦發(fā)銀行核心競爭力研究 專業(yè)： 金融學 指導教師：劉迎春 學院： 商務學院 學號： 2012030403041 班級： 金融1202S 姓名：方楊陽 一、外文原文What Drives the Persistent Competitiveness of Small BankBill Bassett, Tom Brady.Finance and Economics Discussion Series (Vol.5 2002), 24-30Thedeclineintherealvalueofdepositinsurance,however,isonlyoneofseveraltrendsinthefinancialindustrythatcouldhaveweakenedthecompetitivenessofsmallbanksinrecentyears.Amongtheseotherdevelopmentshavebeenthereturntohealthoflargebanknumerousmergersthathaveincreasedthesizeandscopeoflargebanks,andthecontinuedincreaseincompetitionfrommutualfundsandothernonbankfinancialcompanies.MergersandacquisitionshavereducedthenumberofbanksintheUnitedStatesfrommorethan14,000in1985toabout8,300attheendof2000,andduringthistimetheshareofdomesticbankingassetsheldbythelargest100banksrosefromabouthalftoalmostthree-fourths(Chart2).Studiesofconsolidationinthebankingindustryandofitsimpactonsmallbankcompetitivenesshavereacheddifferingconclusions.However,consolidationinteractswiththedeclineintherealvalueofdepositinsurancetocreateanotherpotentiallyadverseimpactonthecompetitivenessofsmallbanks.Thecreationof“mega-banks”increasesthepossibilitythatdepositorswouldconsidertheselargerbankstobe“toobigtofail”(TBTF),whichwouldimplicitlyconferagreaterlevelofdepositinsuranceuponlargebankcustomersthanthoseofsmallbanks.SmallerbankscontendthatanincreaseinthenominalvalueofdepositinsuranceisneededtohelpoffsetthisperceptionofaTBTFpolicy(IndependentCommunityBankersAssociation2000).Theevolutionoflarge,complexbankingorganizationshasledfederalbankregulatorstowarnthattheseinstitutionscreatethepotentialforunusuallylargesystemicriskstothenationalandinternationaleconomiesshouldtheyfail(Greenspan1999).However,theFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationImprovementActof1991(FDICIA)circumscribedregulatorsabilitytoinvokeTBTF.ItrequiredthattheFDICpursuetheresolutionmethodthatposestheleastcosttoitsinsurancefundwhendealingwithafailedbank,andstipulatedthatexceptionstothe“l(fā)eastcost”methodmustgarnertheapprovalofsupermajoritiesofboththeFederalReserveandFDICboardsplusthatoftheSecretaryoftheTreasuryinconsultationwiththePresidentoftheUnitedStates.AngbazoandSaunders1997foundthecostoffundstolargebanksincreasedafterFDICIAwasimplemented,suggestingthatbankcreditorsbelievedthatFDICIAreducedthelikelihoodofalargebankbenefitingfromaTBTFpolicy.Moreover,bankregulatoryagenciesmaintainthatnobankistoolargeforshareholdersandnondepositliabilityholderstofacecompleteloss,andforuninsureddepositorstobesubjecttolessthan100percentreimbursement,shouldthedeclineinbankassetvaluesbelargeenough(Greenspan2001).Inadditiontotheconsolidationofthebankingsystem,thecontinuedgrowthofnonbankfinancialinstitutionsmayhaveweakenedthecompetitivesituationofsmallrelativetolargebanksinrecentyears(DAristaandSchlesinger1993).Althoughsavingsandloanassociations,creditunions,mutualfundsandfinancecompaniescompetewithbanksofallsizes,theylikelyposeagreatercompetitivechallengetosmallerbanks.Inadditiontobeingmoredependentondepositfundingthanthelargerbanks,smallbanksalsotendtobemoreconcentratedthanlargebanksinthetypesofloansextendedbyfinancecompanies(Dynan,Johnson,andSlowinski2002).Overtheperiodstudied,however,anoutrightdeclineinthriftindustryassetsoffsettheaddedcompetitionfromothertypesofnonbankfinancialcompanies,particularlymoneymarketmutualfunds.Inthelate1980sandearly1990s,thecompetitivepositionofsmallbankslikelywasboostedasaresultofthemoreseveredeteriorationinassetqualityatlargebanks,andthewidergapatlargebanksbetweenactualcapitallevelsandthosebeingdemandedbymarketsandthenewBasleaccord(Chart3).However,thesubsequenteconomicrecoveryandbriskexpansionofthesecondhalfofthe1990scauseddelinquencyratestodropdramatically,particularlyatlargebanks.Atthesametime,thegapbetweentheleverageratiossmallbanksandlargebanksalsonarrowednoticeably,aslargebanksboostedtheircapitalfollowingtheimplementationoftheBasleAccordsin1991.Despitetheaforementionedheadwindsaffectingsmallbankscompetitiveness,BassettandBrady2001foundthatsmallbankshavegrownmorerapidlythanlargerbanksovertheperiodfrom1985to2000.Moreover,theyshowedthatsmallbankshavelargelymaintainedorevenincreasedtheirlevelsofprofitabilitythroughoutmuchoftheperiodstudied,despitepayingincreasinglylargepremiumsontheirdepositsrelativetolargebanksinordertofundtheirmorerapidassetexpansion.Thepurposeofthisstudyistoextendthisresearchbymoreformallyexaminingthedifferentialimpactoftheinfluencesmentionedaboveonthecompetitiveperformanceofsmallbanksovertheperiodfromthemid-1980sto2001.First,weemployanarbitragemodeltoexaminetherelationshipbetweenrelativeaverageinterestratesondepositsatsmallandlargebanks,thelevelofdepositinsurance,bankfailurerates,andperceptionsaboutTBTF.ThemodeldemonstratesthatthesensitivityofrelativedepositratestothelevelofdepositinsuranceorviewsabouttheimportanceofTBTFisquitelowwhenbankfailureratesarelow,astheyhavebeeninrecentyears.Wethenpresenteconometricevidencesuggestingthattherisingrelativecostofdepositsatsmallbanksvis-vislargebanksoverthepastdecadelargelyreflectssmallbanksneedtoattractfundingtosustaintheiraggressiveandprofitableassetexpansion.Theshareofuninsureddeposits,whichhasrisenastherealvalueofdepositinsurancehasdeclined,andamarkedimprovementinthebalancesheethealthoflargebanksduringthe1990splayedsomewhatsmallerrolesinboostingdepositratesatsmallbanks.Thenextsectiondescribesthedatausedinthearticleandidentifiessomekeybalancesheetdifferencesbetweenlargeandsmallbanks.SectionIIIillustratesthatsmallbankshavebeenabletogrowfasterthanlargebanksbyofferingbetterdepositratesandthatthepremiumtheypayhasbeenrisingovertime.SectionIVpresentsanarbitragemodelofdepositpricingatlargeandsmallbanksthatincorporatesdepositinsuranceand“TooBigToFail”effects.SectionVpresentsregressionestimatesfromareducedformmodelofdepositratedeterminationatlargeandsmallbanks.ConclusionsarepresentedinsectionVI.II.DataandSummaryStatisticsExceptwhereotherwiseindicated,datainthispaperarefromthequarterlyReportsofConditionandIncome(CallReports)forthedomesticofficesofinsureddomesticallycharteredcommercialbanksandnondeposittrustcompanies(hereafter,banks).Inthisarticle,largebanksarethoseranked1through100basedonassetsatthestartofeachquarter.Smallbanksarethoserankedoutsideofthelargest1,000.Atthestartofthefourthquarterof2000,largebankshadassetsofatleast$6.94billion,whileallsmallbankshadassetsoflessthan$331million.A.Keybalancesheetdifferencesbetweensmallandlargebanks.Smallbanksrelyconsiderablymoreondepositsthandolargebanks.Inparticular,smalltimedeposits(thoseissuedinamountsoflessthan$100,000)fundedalmost30percentofloansandotherassetsatsmallbanksin2000,whileatlargebanksthesharewas10percent(Table1).Theshareofsmallbanksassetsfundedwithlargetimedeposits,13percent,alsoexceedsthatatlargebanks,8percent.Otherinterest-bearingdeposits,whichconsistofsavingsandtransactionsaccounts,alsoweresomewhatmoreimportantfundingvehiclesatsmallbanks,whilenoninterest-bearingdepositsfundedcomparablesharesofsmallandlargebanksassetsin2000.Largebanksfundedaboutone-thirdoftheirassetswithothernondepositliabilitiesin2000,whereasatsmallbanksthesharewasjust3percent.SmallbanksavailedthemselvessomewhatmoreofFHLBadvances,althoughtheserepresentafairlysmallshareofliabilitiesatbothgroupsofbanks.Equityalsofundedalargershareofassetsatsmallthanatlargebanks,10.3percentand8percentrespectively.Relianceondepositschangedlittlebetween1987and1992,butbothbankgroupsshiftedtowardnondepositliabilitiesandcapitalassourcesoffundingduringthe1990s.Between1992and2000,depositsasashareofassetsfellabout4percentagepointsatsmallbanksand10percentagepointsatlargebanks.Forbothbankgroups,otherinterest-bearingdepositswasthedepositcategorythatfellmostinthe1990s,althoughatlargebanks“non-interest-bearingdeposits”declinedalmostasmuch.Smalltimedeposits(whicharefullyinsured)declinedbysimilaramountsatbothbankgroups,adropprobablyreflectingtheincreasedpopularityofalternativehouseholdinvestmentvehiclessuchasmutualfunds.However,theshareofassetsfundedbylargetimedepositsactuallyincreasedatbothbankgroups,withalargerincreasepostedatsmallbanks.Atsmallbanks,thetypeandaveragesizeoflargedepositaccounts(allthoseofatleast$100,000)arenotablydifferentfromthoseatlargebanks(table1,memo).Atlargebanks,onlyabout30percentofsuchbalanceswereheldaslargetimedepositsin2000;theremaining70percentwereintransactionandsavingsaccounts.Atsmallbanks,largebalancesaresplitaboutevenlybetweenlargetimeandotherdeposits.Theaveragesizeoflargedepositsatlargebanksin2000was$425,000,andatsmallbanksitwas$229,000;however,overthe1990stheaveragesizedeclinedatlargebanksandroseatabouttherateofinflationatsmallbanks.B.Growthpatternsforlargeandsmallbanks.Asnoted,themergersthathavebeenthevehicleofconsolidationtypicallyhaveinvolvedtheacquisitionofsmallerbanksbymuchlargerbanks.This,ofcourse,boostsmeasuredgrowthoflargebanksanddiminishesthatofsmallbanks.Toaccountforthisinexaminingthebalancesheetgrowthandprofitabilityofsmallvis-vislargebanks,wemerger-adjustdatafromthequarterlyReportsofConditionandIncome,filedbyallfederallyinsuredcommercialbanks.Balancesheetdataadjustedformergersshowthatsmallbanksgenerallyhavegrownfasterthaneithermedium-sizedorlargebanksoverthepastfifteenyears(chart4,toppanel).Indeed,ineveryyear,thegrowthofassetshasbeensignificantlyfasteratsmallbanksthanatlargebanks.Ofcourse,bankssecuritizeandsellasignificantportionoftheconsumerandrealestateloansthattheyoriginateandtherebymovethemofftheirbalancesheets.Butdataavailablesince1997indicatethatrestoringsecuritizedcreditcardloanstolargebanksbalancesheetswouldnotnarrowthedifferenceingrowthratessignificantly.Ofcourse,addingsecuritizedassetstothebalancesheetforpurposesofcomparisonpresumesthatthesecuritizingbankstillwouldhavechosentooriginatetheloanseveniftheopportunitytosecuritizewasnotavailable.Inaddition,anaverageofabout350new,ordenovo,bankswereformedeachyearduringthe1997-2000period,comparedwithabout150peryearduringtheprecedingfouryears.Althoughdenovobankstendtogrowrapidly,thegrowthrateofallsmallbanksisnotsignificantlyaffectedifdenovobanksareexcludedfromthecalculation.Moreover,theacceleratedpaceofentryintoafastgrowingsectorprovidessubstantialevidenceoftheattractivenessofsmallbankstoinvestors.Assuggestedbytherelativeratesofmerger-adjustedassetgrowth,theexpansionoftotaldepositsatsmallbankshasalsoexceededthegrowthrateatlargebanksineveryyearsince1985,afteradjustingformergers(chart4,middlepanel).Uninsureddepositsalsogrewsignificantlyfasteratsmallbanksthanatlargebanks(chart4,bottompanel).Furthermore,thegrowthrateofuninsureddepositsatsmallbankshasbeenhighandsteadilyincreasingduringthesecondhalfofthepastdecade,whereasatlargerbanksthegrowthoftheseliabilitiesshowsnotrend.However,thegrowthofassetstendedtoexceedthatofdeposits,astheuseofnondepositliabilitiesgrewforallbanksizegroups. 二、譯文是什么推動中小銀行的持久性競爭力Bill Bassett, Tom Brady.財經討論系列 (2002年第5期), 24-30在金融行業(yè)，存款保險的實際價值下降，削弱了一些小銀行競爭力，成為近年來的趨勢之一。在其他方面，有許多通過并購健康增長的大規(guī)模影響范圍廣的銀行，從共同基金和其他非銀行金融公司的競爭中獲得不斷增加的回報。與1985年14000多個銀行相比，2000年底的通過兼并和收購，銀行數(shù)量已經減少到8300多個。在此期間，國內銀行由最大的100家銀行持有的資產的份額上升到近四分之三（圖2）。綜合研究銀行業(yè)和其對小銀行競爭力的影響已達到不同的結論。但是，鞏固交互中的存款保險的實際價值下降，導致了另一個對小銀行的競爭力可能造成的不良影響。對“超級銀行“創(chuàng)造的可能性，增加存款的客戶會考慮將這些大銀行“太大而不能倒“（TBTF），這將隱式授予后的存款比小銀行的大銀行客戶的保險更高水平。規(guī)模較小的銀行聲稱，在存款保險的名義價值增加需要幫助抵消了TBTF政策的看法（獨立社區(qū)銀行家協(xié)會2000）。大型、復雜的銀行組織演變，導致聯(lián)邦銀行監(jiān)管機構警告說，對于國家和國際經濟來說，這些機構創(chuàng)造了非常大的系統(tǒng)性風險，一旦他們失?。ǜ窳炙古?999）。然而，聯(lián)邦存款保險公司1991年的改進法（FDICIA）監(jiān)管機構的能力援引TBTF。它要求聯(lián)邦存款保險公司追求的決議方法，銀行交易以最少的成本構成其保險基金與失敗時，并規(guī)定了“最低成本“的方法，必須爭取超級多數(shù)聯(lián)邦儲備委員會和聯(lián)邦存款保險公司的批準，該庫務司在與總統(tǒng)協(xié)商美國。FDICIA實施，這意味著債權銀行認為，F(xiàn)DICIA減少了一大，從一TBTF政策受益銀行的可能性。此外，銀行監(jiān)管機構認為，沒有銀行股東和非存款債權持有人要面對完全的損失，未保險存款人受不到百分之百報銷，應在銀行資產價值下降必須足夠大（格林斯潘2001）。對于大型銀行來說，除了銀行制度的鞏固之外，近來年非銀行金融機構繼續(xù)增長可能削弱了相對競爭的局面（德阿里斯塔和施萊辛格1993）。雖然儲蓄和貸款協(xié)會，信貸工會，共同基金和財務公司競支持所有規(guī)模的銀行，規(guī)模較小的銀行可能造成更大的競爭挑戰(zhàn)。與大銀行相比，除了對更多的存款的資金依賴，小銀行也往往比大銀行集中在金融公司提供的貸款類型(丹尼,約翰遜和斯沃斯科2002)。但是，在此期間的研究表明，儲蓄行業(yè)資產直接下降抵消了非銀行金融企業(yè)，尤其是貨幣市場共同基金的其他類型的競爭。在19實際80年代末和90年代初，由于資產質量的惡化情況比大銀行嚴重，實際資本水平之間的差距，和正在推動的新巴塞爾協(xié)議的要求，小銀行的競爭地位受到巨大影響（圖3）。然而，隨之而來的經濟復蘇和19實際90年代后半迅速擴張造成的拖欠率急劇下降，特別是在大型銀行。同時，小銀行和大銀行杠桿比率之間的的差距也明顯縮小，因為大銀行提高資本繼1991年巴塞爾協(xié)議的實施。盡管有影響小銀行競爭力的上述不利因素，巴塞特和布雷迪2001發(fā)現(xiàn)，從1985年至2000年期間，小銀行比大銀行的增長更迅速。此外，他們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在整個研究期間，盡管支付越來越大的存款保費給相對大的銀行以資助他們更快速的資產擴張，大部分小銀行已經基本上保持盈利水平。本研究的目的是在上述差別的前提下，延長小銀行80年代中期至2001年期間競爭績效的影響。首先，我們利用套利模型來探討在小型和大型銀行之間的相對平均存款利率的關系，主要影響因素包括存款保險，銀行倒閉率，TBTF認知水平。該模型表明，相對存款利率敏感性的存款保險或意見有關TBTF重要性水平相當?shù)蜁r，銀行故障率很低。然后，我們目前的經濟計量證據(jù)表明，相對于過去十年來說，存款的相對成本上升，在可見的小銀行很大程度上反映了小銀行需要吸引資金，以維持其侵略擴張和盈利資產的大型銀行。1990年代在大銀行的資產負債表顯示，對未投保的存款，已經作為存款保險的實際價值增加的份額下降，起到了顯著的改善和促進小規(guī)模的銀行存款利率健康的作用。下一節(jié)介紹的文章中使用的數(shù)據(jù)，并確定一些平衡小銀行與大銀行之間差異的關鍵。第三節(jié)說明提供更好的存款利率，小銀行已經能夠比大銀行更快地成長通過，而他們繳納保險費已隨著時間的推移不斷上升。第四節(jié)論述大、小銀行的存款保險和結合“大到不能倒“效應的存款定價套利模型。第五節(jié)提出從降低存款利率表上的對大，小銀行模型進行回歸估計。第六節(jié)結論。除非另有說明，本文數(shù)據(jù)來自（公開報告）國內特許商業(yè)銀行和非存款信托公司（以下簡稱銀行）國內辦事處的季度報告。在這篇文章中，大銀行的資產指的是，排名1到100的基礎上每個季度開始的資產。而那些小銀行則排名的1000之外。截至2000年第四季度初，大型銀行至少69.4萬美元的資產，而所有小銀行總資產低于3.31億美元。相當多的小銀行比大型銀行更依靠存款。特別是，小額定期存款為主的小型銀行在2000年近30%的貸款依賴與存款（金額少于10萬美元的發(fā)行者），而在大銀