世界經濟千年史前兩章.doc

世界經濟千年史2004年第54期（總第470期）2004年9月28日荷蘭格羅寧根大學教授、世界經濟千年史作者Maddison先生在中國經濟研究中心萬眾樓做了題為“世界經濟千年史”的講座，集中討論了宏觀經濟計量歷史研究的發(fā)展進程。下面是他報告的主要內容。宏觀經濟計量歷史的發(fā)展經歷了三個歷史階段：20世紀50年代以來的“收入和財富國際研究協(xié)會時期”即IARIW時期（International Association for Research in Income and Wealth）；18201950年的庫茲涅斯研究為代表的時期或“Kuznetsian時期”；15001820年商人資本主義年代。50年代以來，宏觀計量的主要目的是提供可能的政策選擇以改善國家的增長表現以及進行國家間差異分析。我們現在有50年代以來世界大部分國家的增長和收入的官方估計。而在Kuznetsian時代，數量經濟史學家在測量世界經濟增長和量化增長因素方面取得了巨大進展。雖然仍有一些領域需要改進，但對這個時期經濟發(fā)展大致輪廓沒有實質爭議。相反，關于商人資本主義年代的世界經濟的描述則存在很大分歧，作為代表的是亞當、斯密的樂觀看法和馬爾薩斯的悲觀論。20世紀50年代以來的IARIW時代雖然50年代以來標準國民經濟核算體系逐漸被采用，但是現存估計中仍有很多問題。使用蘇聯MPS體系（material production system）的國家增長被高估，需要做大量調整。非洲許多新生國家缺少必要的技術和資金進行國民收入增長核算，雖然國際組織工作在一定程度上彌補了這種不足，但是非洲數據也需要做大量調整。還有1995年以來一些高收入國家開始引入享樂指數（hedonic index）來反映產品質量的改善，但是這么做并沒有充分的根據并且會高估經濟增長，比如美國用新的計量技術重新進行19291950年國民經濟核算，結果使國內生產總值(GDP)的增長率由2.6%增加到3.5%。最后關于教育和知識的計量也還沒有成熟理論。另一問題是購買力平價轉換與國家間GDP水平比較。政府統(tǒng)計官員會提供真實價格計算的總產出和總支出數據，經濟學家、新聞記者和官員們都將其作為經濟增長和波動的主要指標。購買力平價方法與用真實價格計量的目的是一樣的，即修正價格差異使真實產出和支出水平的有效比較成為可能。以匯率轉換的GDP與以購買力平價轉換的GDP區(qū)別非常大。以購買力平價計算的發(fā)展中國家的GDP要大大高于以匯率轉換的GDP，差距可能達到3-5倍。同時發(fā)達國家GDP以匯率計算則容易被高估。更為明顯的一個例子是1950年中國和印度以匯率計算人均GDP分別是$85和$175（1990年價格），這兩個數據低得讓人難以置信。那么為何匯率轉換還如此經常的被使用呢？一方面出于無知和支持自己觀點的需要，另一方面許多發(fā)展國家不愿意接受購買力平價方法，因為擔心這會不利于他們申請世行的優(yōu)惠貸款和資助。這導致了經濟間比較分析的明顯錯誤，媒體經常稱日本是世界第二大經濟雖然其GDP還不到中國的60，英國的政客們也始終相信英國的經濟規(guī)模比中國大。18201950年的Kuznetsian時代Simon Kuznets教授對現代經濟增長的研究成果，使可以數量化研究的時間界限從20世紀50年代推進到19世紀20年代。關于這段時期我們現有的幾個結論是：加速的經濟增長始于1820年而非Kuznets認為的1760年；經濟學家對西歐各國研究表明西歐的崛起是同時而非交錯發(fā)生的；這段時期快速發(fā)展加大了西方與其他國家的差距；Kuznets研究推翻了Kondratieff長期循環(huán)的說法和Schumpeter循環(huán)發(fā)展論點。事實上1820年以來的技術變革不是浪潮式的而是連續(xù)推進的，目前有足夠證據把18202001這段時間劃分為5個不同的發(fā)展階段。其中19501973年是一個無可比擬的繁榮的黃金時代，這個時期世界GDP年均增長5，世界貿易年均增長8，人均收入有明顯趨同趨勢，大部分地區(qū)經濟增長都快于美國。1973年以后，世界經濟增長明顯下降，各地區(qū)的差異加大，但是基于世界的角度，最近這個階段仍然是增長表現名列第二的階段。區(qū)分領導國家和跟隨國家對于研究技術的動態(tài)傳播和趕超過程是非常重要的，“領導”國家指那些處于技術前沿的國家，而“跟隨”國家指勞動生產率較低的國家。1500年以來共有4個領導國家，16世紀的意大利，16世紀至拿破侖戰(zhàn)爭時期的荷蘭，此后的英國和1890年后的美國。對1820年以來英國、美國和日本的增長分析，最早考慮的是勞動力投入和生產率，戰(zhàn)后資本成了一個非常重要的增長因素，之后又有觀點將“人力資本”看作生產要素。Denison擴展增長分析方法指出1820年以來英國、美國和日本經濟增長表現出以下一些顯著特點：物質資本大量增長，非居住建筑和機器設備增加非常明顯，伴隨在機器設備中加速的技術進步。教育水平大大提高，英國提高了8倍，美國和日本11倍。人均勞動投入在英國和日本下降了40，在美國下降了20。對外貿易占GDP的比重在英國由3增至25，日本0.2至13，美國2至10。自然資源的缺乏對增長并不構成限制，人均土地在美國下降了14倍，英國和日本下降了4倍。能源的投入增長比較溫和，美國人均增長了3倍，英國6倍，日本8倍。15001820年的商人資本主義年代關于商人資本主義年代（15001820）經濟表現，在18世紀末就已經存在兩種不同的解釋。亞當、斯密樂觀地認為，美洲大陸和新航線的發(fā)現給大型經濟，國際貿易和專業(yè)化的發(fā)展創(chuàng)造了新的機會，雖然因為對貿易的共同限制，這些機會不能被充分利用。馬爾薩斯則悲觀論則認為，經濟表現取決于人口增長和固定的土地供給間的平衡，技術進步、資本形成和國際貿易專業(yè)化的因素被忽略，因此只有通過災難（戰(zhàn)爭、饑荒、疾?。┎拍軐崿F平衡。這兩種觀點對立一直存在。此外悲觀的看法有了一些其他的支持，LeRoy Ladurie認為法國13001720年的經濟是停滯的，真實工資論者則更加悲觀他們有人認為英國1820年的生活水平比1500年下降了44等等。關于15001820不同國家和地區(qū)的經濟表現，Kuznets在1965年提出了關于西歐人口率和人均GDP增長的一個非常有影響的假說，認為西歐發(fā)達國家15001750年可能的（并且或許是最大的）長期人均產出年均增長率為0.2%。對上述假說驗證表明，西歐15001820年人均年增長率為0.14，顯著小于Kuznets估計，美洲國家整體而言人均GDP增長快于西歐，非洲南部和北部的發(fā)展差異比較明顯，亞洲國家整體而言收入水平是停滯的，日本的人均表現要好于中國和印度，但是非常明顯中國這個時期有著廣泛的增長，它在人口大量增長的情況下生活水平并沒有下降并且GDP的增長與西歐一樣顯著。在分析商人資本主義時代的增長時，增長分析的方法就不再適用了。研究表明，人均勞動投入、資本和人力資本、知識在這個時期都有增加，但是非常明顯的是全球化在這個時期起到了比以往更加重要的作用，相對來說全球化在這段時期的作用比在20世紀還要重要。西方造船業(yè)和航海的巨大發(fā)展，使世界貿易在15001820年增長了20倍。歐洲國家還從殖民地，非洲奴隸貿易中獲取了很多利益。美洲國家則經歷了生態(tài)、技術和人口的轉型。引進新的農作物提高了糧食的產量；馬和其他牲畜的引入則改善了交通條件；歐洲各種技術的引入也有助于經濟的發(fā)展；歐洲疾病使2/3土著居民死亡，加上歐洲人和非洲奴隸大量涌入，改變了美洲的人口結構。非洲和亞洲國家也引入了美洲農作物。此外還存在大陸間的技術傳遞，歐洲向美洲輸出武器、工具、車輛、船和造船技術、印刷、文字、教育和政治經濟機構，歐洲采礦技術在美洲應用生產出大量金銀供歐洲與亞洲進行貿易，同時期歐洲從亞洲引入了紡織和陶瓷技術。與亞當斯密和馬爾薩斯關于商人資本主義的對立解釋相對應，關于現代化的根源有非常不同的看法。有一個學派認為現代經濟增長源于工業(yè)革命，而之前則是幾個世紀的馬爾薩斯停滯。很多人支持這個觀點，但是這些觀點在根本上是錯誤的。事實上向現代資本主義過渡經歷了長時間的準備。首先是教育和知識的傳播由于印刷術的發(fā)明和推廣而變革；其次造船業(yè)和航海業(yè)到1820年也發(fā)生了變革，船只的設計、裝備和天文知識都大大改善，有了精確的航海指導等等。這些進展都是科研努力的結果。無疑，歐洲的這些發(fā)展是19和20世紀經濟更快發(fā)展的前奏，歐洲的現代化不是一蹴而就的。（任麗達、盧鋒整理） - 發(fā)貼時間： 2004-10-17 2:28:56 218.31.*.* errantking 等級：貧農財產：經驗：魅力： 注冊：2003-9-7 文章：55 鑒定：保密 - Measuring and Interpreting World Economic Performance 1500-2001*Angus MaddisonThis is a suitable occasion for surveying the progress achieved, in the past 60 years, in quantifying world economic development, and analysing the causal influences which determine the pace and pattern of growth. This was a major objective of the founding fathers of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth (IARIW). The initiative for creating an association including both academics and official statisticians came from Simon Kuznets (1901-85), the pioneer of quantitative economic history. Milton Gilbert (1909-79) and Richard Stone (1913-1991) were strategic partners with enormous international leverage in creating and diffusing standard procedures for construction of comparable national accounts by official statistical offices.This paper analyses the development of macro-measurement in three epochs:a) for the IARIW epoch, back to 1950, the main purpose has been to illuminate policy options to improve growth performance at the national level and to analyse inter-country divergence in real income levels to help devise policies for catch-up. We now have official estimates of growth and levels for the vast bulk of the world economy from 1950 onwards.b) For the Kuznetsian epoch of “modern economic growth” back to 1820, quantitative economic historians have made great progress in measuring world economic growth and in quantifying the forces determining performance. There is scope for further research to fill gaps and crosscheck existing estimates, but the broad contours of development in this period are not under serious challenge.c) for the “merchant capitalist” epoch, 1500-1820, there are sharply divergent interpretations about world, and particularly European performance. The dichotomy between positive and negative assessments started with Adam Smith and Malthus at the end of the 18th century. In my view, the evidence for the Malthusian view is shoddy.Historians usually start at the beginning of their chronology. Quantitative economic historians have to work backwards from the present, proceeding from what is known and accepted, to earlier epochs where evidence is weaker and there is greater reliance on clues and conjecture. *This is the first Ruggles Lecture, delivered at the 28th IARIW General Conference, Cork, Ireland August 2004I(i) Standardised Estimates of GDP Growth for 1950 onwardsThe standardised accounts provide a coherent macroeconomic framework covering the whole economy, crosschecked in three ways. From the income side, they are the total of wages, rents and profits. On the demand side, they are the sum of final expenditures by consumers, investors and government. From the production side, the sum of value added in different sectors-agriculture, industry and services, net of duplication.Milton Gilbert had been responsible for the official US accounts during the war and from 1950 to 1961 was head of statistics and national accounts in OEEC. The Marshall Plan required criteria for aid allocation, and NATO needed them for its burden-sharing exercises. Gilbert met these requirements by pushing official statistical offices of the 16 OEEC member countries to adopt the standardised system of accounts designed by Richard Stone. Stone set up a programme in Cambridge to train official European statisticians to implement the standardised system. A set of national handbooks was prepared to explain the problems of adjustment to the standardised system, and a first comparative set of accounts for the 16 countries for 1938 and 1947-52 was published by OEEC in 1954, with extensive notes explaining the adjustments which had been made to achieve comparability.In 1953, Stone became chairman of a United Nations commission which established a system of accounts for worldwide application. The UN could not exert as much leverage on its member countries to conform as was possible in OEEC. The communist countries used the Soviet SMS (system of material accounts) which had a narrower definition of productive activity (excluding many service activities), involved serious double counting (measuring gross output without deducting inter-sector transfers of inputs) and exaggerated economic growth. The price system and tax-structures were different from those in capitalist countries, and measurement conventions gave incentives to exaggerate quality change when new products were introduced. Abram Bergson (1914-2003) pioneered procedures for re-estimation of Soviet GDP on a basis corresponding approximately to Western conceptions in coverage, with elimination of double-counting, and repricing on an “adjusted factor cost” basis with imputation for capital costs which were not considered in Soviet accounting. These corrective procedures were applied to Soviet statistics by a team of CIA Sovietologists in Washington. In New York, Thad Alton and his colleagues did the same for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. This work was financed for intelligence purposes, but was publicly available in annual reports to the US Congress (see Maddison 1998b).In the 1990s most of these countries adopted the standardised SNA system in principle, but implementation was complicated by the massive change in ownership, in the level and structure of prices, allocation of resources between consumption and investment, and statistical reporting procedures. It will take some years before these problems can be fully resolved. The IMF continues to use exaggerated measures of GDP growth for these countries. As a result, it shows a growth in world GDP averaging 3.9 percent a year for 1970-200, compared with my estimate of 3.3 percent. For China it shows growth averaging 8.5 per cent a year, whereas my adjusted measure shows a growth rate of 6.5 per cent (see Maddison, 2003, p. 231).Another area of weakness is Africa, where there was and still is a great shortage of skills and money for such work in a large number of newly created countries. The gap in estimates of GDP growth was filled in substantial degree by the OECD Development Centre which compiled annual estimates of real GDP growth 1950-90 for 51 African countries. The Centre benefited from the expertise of Derek Blades, who had been chief statistician in Malawi for eight years, and by David Roberts who had similar experience in Gambia. A third problem in the assessment of GDP growth performance in the higher income countries derives from recent changes in measurement conventions from 1995 onwards, involving adoption of hedonic indexes to adjust for assumed changes in quality of product, use of chain indices, and treatment of consumer software as investment. Hedonic indices are perfectly respectable in small doses, but one can be skeptical about the widespread assumption that quality changes have been so large and monotonically positive. In the USA, where the switch to hedonics was most significant, their net impact was to raise the measured rate of growth to a somewhat greater degree than in Western Europe and Japan. US official estimates go back to 1929, and the changes in measurement technique had their biggest impact for 1929-50, raising the GDP growth rate for that period from 2.6 percent a year to 3.5. There was no counterpart to this long retrospective readjustment in other countries, and I have continued to use the earlier US official measure for 1929-50 (for reasons explained in Maddison, 2001, p. 138, and Maddison, 2003, pp.79-80). More than 40 years ago, Milton Gilbert warned that such adjustments could open Pandoras box: “In the end, they would make it impossible to construct measures of output and price changes that are useful to the study of economic growth” (Gilbert, 1961, p. 287). The danger which arises from an overdose of hedonics is discussed in Appendix 3.Ed Denison (1915-1992) expressed opposition to changes in national accounting which treat accretions of knowledge as investment. He considered this a “misclassification” which made “growth analysis chaotic” (see Denison, 1989, p. 10). A major justification for his complaint was that his growth accounts included “human capital”, i.e. increments in the quality of the labour force due to increases in the level of education.In fact, the only form of knowledge which is now treated as investment is computer software. It is odd to treat this rapidly depreciating knowledge as investment, whilst ignoring the more durable influence of books and education.(ii) Purchasing Power Converters for Cross-country Comparison of GDP Levels Once standardised accounts of real GDP growth in national currencies had been established for all OEEC countries, the next step to facilitate inter-country comparison and multi-country aggregation was the development of purchasing power parity converters (PPPs) to measure real GDP levels, rather than relying on exchange rate comparison. The first OEEC study, co-authored by Milton Gilbert and Irving Kravis (1916-92). appeared in 1954, a second in 1958. They compared real expenditure levels in 8 OEEC countries. A third volume by Paige and Bombach (1959) compared real output levels in the UK and USA. Kravis and his colleagues, Alan Heston and Robert Summers improved the methodology of PPP estimation in their ICP project at the University of Pennsylvania from 1968 onwards.The OEEC studies were binary comparisons between pairs of countries. The three options were i) a Paasche PPP, with “own-country” quantity weights; ii) a Laspeyres PPP with the quantity weights of the numeraire country-the United States; iii) a compromise geometric (Fisher) average of the first two measures. The corresponding measures of real expenditure were: i) Laspeyres comparisons of GDP levels based on the prices (unit values) of the numeraire country; ii) Paasche level comparisons based on “own-country” prices (unit values); iii) a Fisher geometric average of the two measures. Binary comparisons, e.g. Germany/USA and UK/USA, could then be linked with the USA as the star country. Such star comparisons could provide a proxy Germany/UK comparison, but it was not “transitive” (i.e. the result would not be identical to that derived from a direct Germany/UK comparison). This was not a great drawback for OEEC countries where the inter-country deviation in performance levels was not too wide. But Kravis, Heston and Summers were engaged in comparisons over a much wider range of per capita income. They therefore adopted the Geary-Khamis method, invented by Roy Geary (1896-1983) and Salem Khamis, which multilateralised the results, provided transitivity and other desirable properties. They used it in conjunction with the commodity product dummy method (CPD), invented by Robert Summers, for filling holes in the basic dataset. Their masterpiece was their third study, the 1982 volume World Product and Income, which contained estimates for 34 countries (in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe) in 1975 prices and international Geary-Khamis dollars. These countries accounted for 64 per cent of world GDP in 2001.Table 1 Nature of PPP Converters to Estimate GDP Levels in the Benchmark Year 1990(billion 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars and number of countries)Europe & Latin Asia Africa WorldW. Offshoots America ICP 15,273 (28) 2,131 (18) 8,017 (24) 0 (0) 25,421 (70)PWT 59 (3) 71 (14) 524 (16) 891 (51) 1,516 (84)Proxies 16 (10) 38 (15) 87 (17) 14 (6) 155 (48)Total 15,349 (41) 2,240 (47) 8,628 (57) 905 (57) 27,122(202)Source: Maddison (2003), p. 230The UN Statistical Office extended the ICP work and had covered 84 countries by 1985. UNSO then dropped this endeavour, though some of the regional UN bodies continued with it. The OECD recommenced its comparisons on a regular basis in 1982. Its latest work covered the 28 OECD countries and 20 others (in Eastern Europe, the 15 successor states of the USSR, and Mongolia). Alan Heston and Robert Summers produce short-hand estimates of PPPs and real income levels for countries for which full-scale ICP type measures are not available. As a result, we now have reasonably acceptable PPP adjusted measures available for over 99 percent of world GDP,There were three Eurostat estimates (for 1980, 1985 and 1993) of PPPs for 22 African countries, but the results were erratic, and I preferred to use the more comprehensive and plausible results of the Penn World Tables (see Summers and Heston, October 2002). Table 1 summarises the nature of the PPP estimates I used to create my 1990 benchmark estimates of world GDP.Table 2 Worlds 10 Largest Countries: Comparative Ranking, 1950 & 2001, at constant1990 prices, using 1990 Geary-Khamis PPP converters and 1990 exchange rates1950 2001 1950 2001GDP $billion, with 1990 PPP conversion $billion, with 1990 exchange rateUSA 1,456 7,966 1,456 7,966China 240 4,570 47 886Japan 161 2,625 206 3,358India 222 2,003 62 558Germany 265 1,537 337 1,951France 221 1,258 261 1,491UK 348 1,202 363 1,253Italy 165 1,101 191 1,272Brazil 89 990 58 638Russia 315 791 154 388GDP per head 1990 PPP $ 1990 ER $ USA 9,561 27,948 9,561 27,948China 439 3,583 85 541Japan 1,921 20,683 2,458 26,466India 619 1,957 172 545Germany 3,881 18,677 4,928 23,717France 5,271 21,092 6,244 24,985UK 6,939 20,127 7,266 20,985Italy 3,502 19,040 4,046 21,996Brazil 1,672 5,570 1,077 3,588Russia 3,086 5,435 1,515 2,669Source:Maddison (2003)Table 2 shows the difference between PPP and exchange rate conversion for the worlds 10 largest economies (which represented 65 percent of world GDP in 2001). The exchange rate conversions on the right hand side show much lower levels for the poorer countries (China, India, Russia and Brazil) and somewhat higher levels for the west European countries and Japan relative to the USA than the PPP converters. In the case of China the deviation the exchange rate and the PPPs was very large-purchasing power was more than 5 times higher than the exchange rate. In India the ratio was more