亞開行-調(diào)動稅收促進發(fā)展（英）-2024

NO.290

FEBRUARY

2024

ADBBRIEFS

KEYPOINTS:

?DevelopingAsiafaces

significantexpenditurepressuresinitstransitiontomoresustainableandinclusivegrowth.

?Weakerrevenuesandhigherspendingtorespondto

thecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)pandemicerasedfiscalsurplusesorwideneddeficitsinmanyregionaleconomies.

?Newindicativeestimates

oftaxcapacitysuggestthat,onaverage,developing

Asiahasthepotentialto

raisetaxrevenuesbythe

equivalentof3.6%ofgrossdomesticproduct.

?DevelopingAsiashould

explorethepotentialof

untappedtaxsourceslike

property,environmental,andhealthtaxesthatcandirectlycontributetodevelopmentgoalsandraiseadditional

taxrevenues.

?Apartfromtheeffortsto

increasetheleviedtax

revenues,itisalsoimportanttoreducetheinformalsectorandimprovetaxpayers’

compliancethroughfair

taxationandwiserspending.

ISBN978-92-9270-605-0(print)

ISBN978-92-9270-606-7(electronic)ISSN2071-7202(print)

ISSN2218-2675(electronic)

PublicationStockNo.BRF240041

DOI:

/10.22617/BRF240041

MobilizingTaxesforDevelopment

YuhoMyoda

Economist

EconomicResearchandDevelopmentImpactDepartment(ERDI)

AsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)

DonnaFayeBajaroConsultant

ERDI,ADB

DonghyunPark

EconomicAdvisor

ERDI,ADB

DevelopingAsiafacessignificantspendingpressureasittransitionstowardmoresustainableandinclusivegrowth.ThewakeoftheCOVID-19pandemicamplifiedthepublicfiscalpressureasitloweredtaxrevenuesandincreasedpublicspending.Nowistheappropriatetimetoadministerfiscalconsolidationstrategiestailored

tocountry-specificcircumstances—withtaxpolicyplayingavitalrole.Timely

implementationofchangesinthetaxsystemandstrongleadershipandpoliticalwillatthehighestlevelsofgovernment—intandemwitheffortstostrengthentaxadministrationandimprovetaxpayermorale—willyieldtaxreformsuccess.

FISCALPRESSURESONTHERISE

DevelopingAsiafacessignificantspendingpressureasittransitionstowardmore

sustainableandinclusivegrowth.EvenbeforetheCOVID-19pandemic,achieving

theSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)bythetargetyear2030necessitated

theregiontospendanadditional$1.5trillionannually,equalto5%ofgrossdomestic

product(GDP)(UNESCAP2019).Moreover,additionalspendingneedsaretypically

largerinthepoorestcountries(Gasparetal.2019).Astarkillustrationofthistrendis

spendingneedsforclimatefinance:thePacificregion,withjust0.1%ofregionalGDP,

accountsforover1.1%ofthecurrenttotalclimatefinanceintheentireregiontomeet

thenationallydeterminedcontributiontargetof2030(ADB2023).Ontheotherhand,thewakeofthepandemiclikelywidenedthefiscalshortfallsasthecollapseinactivity

loweredrevenueevenasspendingneedsincreased(Benedeketal.2021).

Inthispublication,“$”referstoUnitedStatesdollars.

2

ADBBRIEFSNO.290

Weakerrevenueandhigherspendingerasedfiscalsurplusesorexpandeddeficits.TheoutbreakofCOVID-19hurttheeconomyandpusheduptheexpendituredemands.Whilethegeneral

governmentrevenueinemerginganddevelopingAsiadropped

from25.0%ofGDPin2019to23.6%in2020,totalexpenditureincreasedfrom30.7%to32.6%inthesameperiod,resultingin

thehighergovernmentoutstandingdebtsat73.3%ofGDPin

2022comparedwith58.9%in2019.1Insomeeconomies,debt

hasreacheduncomfortablelevelsandisprojectedtorisefurtherinthecomingyears(Ferrarini,Giugale,andPradelli2022).Manygovernmentswillrequirefiscalconsolidationtoensurefiscal

sustainability(Blanchard,Felman,andSubramanian2021;Favara,Minoiu,andPerez-Orive2021;Koseetal.2021).

Formostgovernments,taxesaretheprimarysourceof

revenueandlargelydefinethepublicspendingenvelopeoverthemediumandlongerterm.2Governmentspendingnormallyexceedstaxrevenue,withthebalancemadeupfromborrowingandnontaxrevenue,thusspendingriseswithtaxrevenuein

developingAsiaandelsewhere(Figure1).WithindevelopingAsia,thecorrelationismuchweakeramongPacificIsland

economies.Thisreflectsthehighcostofprovidinggovernment

servicestodispersedpopulationsandunusuallyhighnontax

revenuefromfisheries,foreignfishingvessellicenses,andofficialdevelopmentassistance(Cabezon,Tumbarello,andWu2015).

TheaveragepublicspendingindevelopingAsia—excluding

PacificIslandeconomies—equalsabout27%ofGDP,comparable

todevelopingregions,butfarbelowtheOrganisationfor

EconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)countries(Figure2).

DevelopingAsianeedstomobilizetaxrevenuetofinance

theadditionalpublicspendingforinclusiveandsustainable

development.Governmentsmustdrawonthefullrangeofpublicandprivatefinancialresourcestomeetvastspendingdemands.

However,bothstate-ownedoperationsrevenueandprivate

financialflowscanbeunreliable.Formostgovernments,taxesaretheprimarysourceofrevenueandstandaloneasthebestoptiontoexpandgovernmentresourcesreliably.Acentralchallengeforgovernmentsistoraiseadditionalrevenuewithoutsacrificing

theeconomicgrowthvitaltoreducepovertyfurtherandraiselivingstandards.

Figure1:TaxandSelectedExpenditure,2015–2019

Highertaxesareassociatedwithhighergovernmentspendingoneducationandhealth,butnotondefense.

15

12

9

6

3

0

Educationspendingas%ofGDP

0DevelopingAsia

Alleconomies

01020304050

Taxas%ofGDP

15

12

9

6

3

0

○

Healthspendingas%ofGDP

15

12

9

6

3

0

Defensespendingas%ofGDP

Alleconomies

DevelopingAsia

Alleconomies

DevelopingAsia

01020304050

Taxas%ofGDP

DevelopingAsia

OECD×Other

01020304050

Taxas%ofGDP

GDP=grossdomesticproduct,OECD=OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

Notes:Expenditureoneducation,health,anddefenseisthe2015–2019averageforeachregion.Fordetails,seeGoE.etal.2022.DevelopingAsia’sFiscalLandscapeandChallenges.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Sources:OECD.GlobalRevenueStatisticsDatabase.

/

;IMF.GovernmentFinanceStatisticsonlinedatabase.

/

;IMF.WorldEconomicOutlookOctober2021onlinedatabase.

/

(allaccessed31January2022);AsianDevelopmentBankestimates.

1IMF.

WorldEconomicOutlookOctober2021onlinedatabase

(accessed6November2023).

2Whilepublicexpenditureisbeyondthescopeofthisbrief,improvingspendingefficiencyisanimportantadditionalavenueforexpandingfiscalspaceandachievingbetteroutcomes.

3

MobilizingTaxesforDevelopment

Figure2:ExpenditureinSelectedRegions,Averagein2015–2019

GovernmentspendingindevelopingAsiaiscomparativelylow,especiallyexcludingPacificIslandeconomies.

%ofGDP

50

40

30

20

10

0

DevelopingAsia,Sub-SaharanexcludingthePacificAfrica

LatinAmericaandCaribbean

High-incomeOECD

GDP=grossdomesticproduct,OECD=OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

Notes:istheunweightedaveragefordevelopingAsiaincludingthe

Pacific.Fordetails,seeGoE.etal.2022.DevelopingAsia’sFiscalLandscapeandChallenges.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Sources:OECD.GlobalRevenueStatisticsDatabase.

/

;IMF.GovernmentFinanceStatisticsonlinedatabase.

/

;IMF.WorldEconomicOutlookOctober2021onlinedatabase.

/

(allaccessed31January2022);AsianDevelopmentBankestimates.

Whiletaxesgenerallydistorteconomicactivityandimpose

welfarecosts,anefficientandequitabletaxmixcontributestostrongandinclusiveeconomicgrowth.3Arobusttaxsystemis

essentialnotonlytoraiserevenueforpublicspendingbutalsotobuildthestate’scapacitytopromotebroaderdevelopment(BesleyandPersson2014;KeenandSlemrod2021).Stateinstitutions

andtaxsystemsevolvetogethertobemutuallyreinforcingas

strongertaxsystemsprovidestateswiththeresourcestobuildstronginstitutionstosupportdevelopment,encouragingwillingtaxcomplianceandsimplifyingtaxcollection.Thecapacitytoraiseadequatetaxesstrengthensstatesovereigntybyreducingdependencyonexternallenders.

TaxrevenueindevelopingAsiaonaverageremainedlow

byinternationalstandards,withalowerrevenueshareof

personalincometax.Forinstance,thetax-to-GDPratioforthoseeconomiesremainsbelowanoften-appliedminimumthresholdofabout15%(Gaspar,Jaramillo,andWingender2016).DevelopingAsiacouldincreasetaxrevenuefromaprepandemicaverageof

about16%ofGDPby3–4percentagepoints.4Theregionrelies

Figure3:TaxRevenueSharebySource,Averagein2015–2019

Asdootherdevelopingregions,developingAsiareliesheavilyonconsumptionandcorporateincometax.

%oftaxrevenue

100

80

60

40

20

0

DevelopingAsia

Sub-SaharanAfrica

LatinAmericaandCaribbean

High-incomeOECD

Value-addedtaxOthergoodsInternationaltradetax

andservicestax

OthertaxCorporateincometaxPersonalincometax

OECD=OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

Note:Fordetails,seeGoE.etal.2022.DevelopingAsia’sFiscalLandscapeandChallenges.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Sources:OECD.GlobalRevenueStatisticsDatabase.

/

;IMF.GovernmentFinanceStatisticsonlinedatabase.

/

(bothaccessed31January2022);AsianDevelopmentBankestimates.

heavilyonvalue-addedtax(VAT)andonotherconsumption

taxes,includingexcises(Figure3).5Onaverage,sumofthe

revenuesfromthosetaxesaccountforalittleunderhalfofthetaxrevenueinregionaleconomies.Thesesharesarecomparableto

thoseinotherregions;andcorporateincometaxesindevelopingAsiaaccountforabout21%oftaxrevenue—alittlehigherthaninotherdevelopingregionsanddoubletheshareinOECDcountries.

Ontheotherhand,personalincometaxesindevelopingAsia

accountfor13%oftaxrevenue—muchlowerthaninOECD

countries,wherethesetaxesmakeupoverathirdoftaxrevenue.

REVENUEMOBILIZATIONANDREFORMATSTAKE

ADBanalysissuggestssignificantroomforraisingadditionaltaxrevenueinSouthandSoutheastAsia(ADB2022).Taxcapacityisthetheoreticalmaximumtaxrevenueaneconomycanmobilize,givenitscharacteristics;andtaxeffortistheratioofactualtax

revenuetotaxcapacity.6Hightaxeffortindicatesactualtax

3Equallyimportantisensuringthatgovernmentresourcesarecompetentlydeployedtominimizewastefulspendingandtaxburdens,supporttaxcompliance,andavoidcrowdingoutprivateexpenditure.Thus,adequateandefficienttaxrevenue,soundspending,andprudentuseofpublicdebtpromoteresilient

governmentfinanceandenableeffectivefiscalpolicyformacroeconomicstabilization.Delong,J.B.andL.Summers.2012.FiscalPolicyinaDepressed

Economy.BrookingsPapersonEconomicActivity1;Cottarelli,C.,P.Gerson,andA.Senhadji.eds.2014.PolicyLessonsfromtheCrisisandtheWayForward.

Post-CrisisFiscalPolicy.MITPress.

4OECD.

GlobalRevenueStatisticsDatabase

;IMF.

GovernmentFinanceStatisticsonlinedatabase

(bothaccessed31January2022);AsianDevelopmentBankestimates.

5VATwasintroducedwidelythroughouttheregionsincethe1980sand1990s.

6Factorssuchasunderdevelopment,loweducationalattainment,andalargeagriculturesectortendtoreducetaxcapacity.Mawejje,J.andR.K.Sebudde.2019.TaxRevenuePotentialandEffort.WorldwideEstimatesUsingaNewDataset.EconomicAnalysisandPolicy63.

4

ADBBRIEFSNO.290

Figure4:TaxPotentialinAsia:TaxCapacityandTaxRevenue,LatestAvailableYear

PotentialtoraisetaxrevenueishighinSoutheastAsia.

%ofGDP

40

30

20

10

0

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

Ratio

FSM

THA

MAL

ROK

SAM

SOL

FIJ

PRC

PHI

SIN

PAK

CAM

IND

TON

INO

VAN

VIE

HKG

PNG

TIM

LAO

MYA

TaxcapacityTaxrevenueTaxeffort(RHS)

CAM=Cambodia,FIJ=Fiji,FSM=FederatedStatesofMicronesia,GDP=grossdomesticproduct,HKG=HongKong,China,IND=India,INO=Indonesia,LAO=LaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic,MAL=Malaysia,MYA=Myanmar,PAK=Pakistan,PHI=Philippines,PNG=PapuaNewGuinea,

PRC=People’sRepublicofChina,RHS=right-handside,ROK=RepublicofKorea,SAM=Samoa,SIN=Singapore,SOL=SolomonIslands,THA=Thailand,TIM=Timor-Leste,TON=Tonga,VAN=Vanuatu,VIE=VietNam.

Note:Effective1February2021,ADBplacedatemporaryholdonsovereignprojectdisbursementsandnewcontractsinMyanmar.ADBStatementonMyanmar.

AsianDevelopmentBank

.Published10March2021.Manila.

Source:Gupta,S.andJ.T.Jalles.2022.PrioritiesforStrengtheningKeyRevenueSourcesinAsia.AsianDevelopmentBank.

collectionclosetotaxcapacityandthuslesspotentialtoincreaserevenue.Loweffortindicatesmoreroomforhigherrevenueby

raisingtaxrates,broadeningtaxbases,orimprovingcompliance.

Newindicativetaxcapacityestimatessuggestthatdeveloping

Asiacanincreasetaxrevenueonaveragebytheequivalentof3.6%ofGDP,whichissignificantgiventhecurrentlowtax(Guptaand

Jalles2022).7Taxeffortislow,andthepotentialtoincreasetaxesissubstantialinSoutheastAsia,particularlyinMalaysiaandThailand.Incontrast,taxeffortandactualrevenuearerelativelyhighinthe

People’sRepublicofChina(PRC),theRepublicofKorea,and

somePacificIslandeconomies(Figure4).Substantialsubregionalvariationexistsintaxcapacityandtaxeffort,whichunderscorestheneedforeconomy-specificapproachestoincreaserevenue.

Makingtaxprogressiveiscriticaltofixtheexcessiveinequality.Centraltoaprogressivetaxsystemispersonalincometaxwith

marginalratesthatimposeproportionatelyhighertaxliabilityon

higherearners.Akeychallengeinincreasingpersonalincometaxrevenueindevelopingeconomiesisprevalentself-employment,asadearthofthird-partyinformationhindersenforcement(Jensen2022).Theaveragetopmarginalrateofabout27%ismuch

lowerthan40%inOECDcountries,butthisobscuresenormousvariationwithintheregion.India,PapuaNewGuinea,andthePRC

havetopmarginalratescomparabletoorhigherthantheOECDaverage,whilemanyCentralAsianeconomiesapplyaflattaxrateof10%–13%(GuptaandJalles2022).

Propertytaxesarepotentiallyprogressive,efficient,anddifficulttoevade.Asshowninthetableonpage5,progressiveincome

taxmaynotbesufficienttoreduceinequalityinsomeeconomies.Ineconomieswherethedistributionofwealthishighlyskewedandthereturnoncapitalisdisproportionatelyhigherthanthewages,acombinationofaprogressiveincometaxwithsomesortofcapitaltaxisessentialtokeepinequalitybelowacceptablelevels.Abig

challengeforimplementingageneralwealthtaxisthemobility

ofassets,butrealestatepropertyislessmobileandthuscannot

readilybeshifted.Also,propertytaxescanbolstersubnational

governments’revenuethatcanbeusedtocovertheincreasing

costsforpublicservicesinthecitiesunderrapidurbanization,

whichisachallengeinsomepartsofdevelopingAsia(Bahland

Bird2018;McCluskey,Bahl,andFranzsen2022).MosteconomiesindevelopingAsialevypropertytaxes,butthesegenerallyraise

littlerevenue—onaverageequaltoafewtenthsofapercentage

pointofGDP(McCluskey,Bahl,andFranzsen2022).Governmentsmustimprovepropertyvaluationtocapturetherisingvalueand

enablegrowthinthetaxbase.

7BenchmarktaxrevenueisestimatedcontrollingforGDPpercapita,thesizeoftheagriculturesector,educationspending,andtradeopenness.

5

MobilizingTaxesforDevelopment

RedistributiveEffectsofFiscalPolicy,LatestAvailableData

FiscalpolicyreducesinequalitymuchlessindevelopingAsiathaninadvancedeconomies.

Gini

Coefficient,

before

Taxand

Benefits

Gini

Coefficient,

after

Taxand

Benefits

DevelopingAsia

42.7

38.4

LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

48.1

45.4

Advancedeconomies

48.3

30.4

Notes:Calculationsusethelatestdataavailableforeacheconomyfrom

2010to2020.DevelopingAsiacomprises38economies;LatinAmerica

andtheCaribbean,26economies;andadvancedeconomies,30economies.TheredistributiveeffectoffiscalpolicyisthedifferencebetweenthemarketincomeGinicoefficientandthenetGinicoefficient.

Source:Gupta,S.andJ.T.Jalles.2022.PrioritiesforStrengtheningKeyRevenueSourcesinAsia.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Corporateincometaxrevenuefacesmultiplepressuresof

erosionindevelopingAsiaaswell.Governmentsmotivatedby

adesiretoattractinternationallymobilecapitalandmaintain

competitivenesshavesteadilyreducedcorporateincometax

ratesacrosstheregionoverthepastfewdecades.Suchratesare

typically20%acrossdevelopingAsia,downfrom30%in2000andalittlelowerthanLatinAmericanandOECDaverages(Figure5).

Apartfromtheinternationalcompetitioninloweringthestatutorytaxrate,taxincentivesarefrequentlyoverusedtoincreasebusinessinvestmentonthegroundsthathigherinvestmentwillultimately

increasetaxrevenues,whichastudyfoundisnotthecase(KronfolandSteenbergen2020).Additionally,expandingactivitiesof

multinationalenterprisesallowthemtoexploittheweaknessof

internationaltaxframework.Becauseofprofitshiftingandtax

avoidanceovercross-bordertransactions,4%–10%ofcorporateincometaxrevenueislostglobally,withlargerlossesindevelopingcountries(Crivelli,DeMooij,andKeen2016).

EnvironmentalandcorrectivehealthtaxescancontributedirectlytotheSDGsbycorrectingbehaviorandraising

additionalrevenue.SomeAsianeconomieshavesometypesofenvironmentaltaxes,includingtaxesonpollutingfossil

fuels.However,in2018,revenuesfromenergy,pollution,and

transportationtaxesinasampleofeconomiesindeveloping

Asiawereonly0.8%ofGDP,farlowerthanthe2.3%inOECD

countries.Correctivehealthtaxes,mainlyonalcoholortobacco

consumption,havealsobecomemorecommonindeveloping

Asia.Thesetaxescandiscouragetheconsumptionofharmful

productsandsavesignificantsocioeconomiccostsbysuppressingearlymortalityfromunhealthydiets.Theproportionofdeaths

fromnoncommunicablediseasesindevelopingAsiahasrisen

substantially—from52%in1990to77%in2019(Figure6).In

low-andmiddle-incomeeconomies,thesecorrectivehealth

taxescanalsoraiseupto0.6%ofGDPinadditionaltaxrevenue(Lane2022).

Figure5:StatutoryCorporateIncomeTaxRatesinDevelopingAsia

Followingglobaltrends,corporateincometaxrateshavedeclinedindevelopingAsia.

Taxrate,%

50

40

30

20

10

0

1990199520002005201020152020

Median25thpercentile75thpercentile

Note:Comprises36economiesindevelopingAsia.

Source:Gupta,S.andJ.T.Jalles.2022.PrioritiesforStrengtheningKeyRevenueSourcesinAsia.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Figure6:RisingBurdenofLifestyleDisease,1990–2019

Lifestylediseasesaccountforagrowingshareofdeaths,especiallyindevelopingeconomies.

DevelopingAsia

CentralAsia

EastAsia

SouthAsia

SoutheastAsia

ThePacific

LatinAmerica

andCaribbean

Advanced

Economies

Sub-Saharan

Africa

%ofalldeaths

100

80

60

40

20

0

1990200020102019

Source:Lane,C.2022.MeetingHealthChallengesinDevelopingAsiawithCorrectiveTaxesonAlcohol,Tobacco,andUnhealthyFoods.AsianDevelopmentBank.

Costlytaxexpendituresneedtobereviewedandtightened,

especiallyforVATandcorporateincometax.TaxexpendituresarewidelyusedindevelopingAsiaandcausesignificantrevenue

losses.Theforgonerevenueinasampleofeconomiesin

developingAsiawassubstantial,equalonaverageto2%ofGDPor14%oftaxrevenue(ADB2022).VATexemptionsmaybenefitthepoor,buttheyoftenbenefitthewealthyevenmorebecausetheyconsumemore,makingexemptionsgenerallyinefficientimprovers

6

ADBBRIEFSNO.290

ofequity.Forcorporateincometax,temporarytaxexpendituresareoftenintroducedinacyclicaldowntermandrepeatedly

extendedforalongerperiod.Temporarystimulusmeasuresshouldbeallowedtoexpire,taxdeferralsshouldberestructured,and

stimulustaxcutsgraduallyremoved.Governmentshouldsimplifytaxexemptionsandstreamlineratestructuresbeforeraisingthetaxrates,asitimprovestaxpayers’compliance.

CONCLUSION

DevelopingAsiaemergesfromtheCOVID-19pandemicwith

weakenedpublicfinances.Whileprivatefinancehasacrucialrole

toplay,achievingtheSDGsforagreenerandmoreinclusivefuture

requiresvastpublicspending.Moreefficientpublicspendingcanfreeupadditionalfiscalresources,butadditionalrevenuemobilization

viataxationisessentialtoaugmentfiscalspaceacrosstheregion.Fundamentaltaxreformwarrantsappropriatetimingofthe

implementation,strongleadership,andpoliticalwillatthehighestlevelsofgovernment;anditisbestdoneintandemwitheffortstostrengthentaxadministrationandimprovetaxpayermorale.

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